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RESUMEN
Este artículo analiza el comportamiento de los tipos de cambio entre España y
Gran Bretaña durante el siglo XVIII; en concreto, de los tipos de cambio en el
mercado de Londres sobre tres ciudades españolas, entre los años 1699 y 1826.
Tras una breve exposición del funcionamiento del sistema monetario español y de
la determinación de los tipos de cambio, estudiamos hasta qué punto el tipo de
cambio respondía a variables fundamentales, utilizando dos modelos teóricos
generalmente aceptados. Los resultados sugieren que la paridad de poder adqui-
sitivo se cumplió durante el siglo XVIII, y que el tipo de cambio se movía de for-
ma paralela a los diferenciales de inflación. Al final del siglo aparecen desviacio-
* This paper stems from a broader line of research on «Financial Markets and Exchange
Rates in 18th Century Spain». We have greatly benefited from comments from conference
participants at the VII Encuentro de Didáctica de la Historia Económica (Murcia, June 2003),
the XI International Congress on the Enlightenment (Los Angeles, August 2003) and the
Economic History Society-Annual Conference (London, April 2004). Financial assistance from
the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (project BHA2000-1337) is gratefully acknowledged.
We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their comments and sugestions. All
remaining errors are ours.
a Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Navarra. 31080 Pamplona, Navarra, SPAIN.
rtorres@unav.es; fgracia@unav.es
b IESE Business School, Departamento de Empresa, Universidad de Navarra. 31080
Pamplona, Navarra, SPAIN. jgbiscarri@iese.edu
RAFAEL TORRES SÁNCHEZ - JAVIER GÓMEZ BISCARRI - FERNANDO PÉREZ DE GRACIA
144
nes de la paridad de poder adquisitivo, que atribuimos a alteraciones en el tipo de
cambio real causadas por fluctuaciones en el comercio bilateral entre España y
Gran Bretaña y, quizá, a diferenciales de productividad.
Palabras clave: tipos de cambio, siglo XVIII, historia financiera, España, Gran
Bretaña, Paridades de Poder Adquisitivo
ABSTRACT
This article explores the behavior of exchange rates in Spain during the 18th
century. We analyze the exchange rates quoted in London on three Spanish cities
between 1699 and 1826. After a brief review of how the Spanish monetary system
worked and how exchange rates were determined, we assess to which extent the
exchange rate responded to market fundamentals by testing two theoretical models
of exchange rate determination. The results suggest that purchasing power parity
held during the 18th century, with the exchange rate tracking quite closely the
behavior of inflation differentials. Deviations from PPP appeared at the end of the
century, due mostly to changes in the real exchange rate caused by the bilateral
trade between Spain and Great Britain and, maybe, due to productivity differentials.
Keywords: exchange rates, 18th century, financial history, Spain, Great Britain,
Purchasing Power Parity
JEL classification: F31, N13, N23
1. INTRODUCTION
Mercantilist states in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries could affect the market
exchange rate of a currency in an effort to attract inflows or to avoid outflows of
specific currencies or simply to obtain fiscal revenues. This could be achieved by
altering the «official» value of the currency and the relative prices of gold and
silver or of silver and copper. However, experience had shown that the multiple
forces at play on the foreign exchange market ended up leading to significantly
different exchange rates1. One of the best descriptions of the working of this
international market was offered by Antonio Bordázar de Artazu in 1736. According
to Bordázar, international monetary relationships could be compared to a music
recital, where each nation was obliged to follow others without losing the rythm:
1 See Van der Wee (1981, p. 375).
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«[…] or let’s say that the value of a currency is comparable to a melody, where
the synchronicity of most players makes the rest know when they are out of tune
and leads to movements up or down of the exchange»2.
Following the metaphor, the role of the conductor could not be played by one
single nation, but corresponded to the market forces or agents, namely the
commercial traders, foreign exchange traders and bankers. Montesquieu commented
that in this hypothetical battle:
«such violent operations [attempts on the part of national governments to
influence the value of precious metals or currencies] could not occur
nowadays, since the Prince who carried them out would be deceiving
himself but would deceive nobody else. Currency exchange [le change]
has taught the banker to compare all World currencies and to assign to
them their fair value […] currency exchange has done away with outrageous
abuses of authority [les grands coups d’autorité)] or, at least, with their
possibilities of success»3.
Exchange rates in those early centuries seemed to be, therefore, the result of
confronting the uncontrollable desires of governments to manipulate the relative
prices of currencies or precious metals with the estimate of the «correct» relative
prices made by the foreign exchange market.
Since purchasing power parity (PPP) was initially formulated in the 16th century,
it has been consistently used as a baseline assumption in both theoretical and
empirical research on exchange rates. The hypothesis that the exchange rate
between two currencies should adjust to keep the prices in the two countries equal
seems to be both intuitive and hard to refute. The empirical evidence in favor of
PPP, however, is weak, and research reporting that PPP fails to hold is by now
abundant4. Explanations for this apparent failure have been offered, some of which
stem from economic considerations –the existence of transportation costs or
barriers to trade, the use of non tradables in the construction of price indices,
government intervention and speculation in the foreign exchange market– and
some from difficulties in the empirical analysis –the use of short data series that
cannot capture the statistical properties of deviations from PPP. Policy variables,
such as the different exchange regimes available and the varying degree of
2 «No hay funámbulos que así procuren sostenerse por medio del equilibrio sobre la cuerda
como las naciones por la igualación de las monedas en el comercio, subiéndolas y bajando
a la igualdad recíproca y conveniente; o digamos que el valor de la moneda es una música,
en que el concierto de los más hace conocer a cualquiera su desentono y para hacer coro,
sube y baja de punto.» Bordázar (1736, p. 104).
3 Cfr. Hirschman (1999, p. 98).
4 See Rogoff (1996) and Froot and Rogoff (1995).
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exchange rate management implied by the regimes, have also been suggested as
possible causes for PPP failure.
Furthermore, the dynamic determination of exchange rates is still an open
question. Models that specify a set of fundamental economic variables that deter-
mine exchange rate behavior have been available for decades but when these
models are fit to the data, the results are far from encouraging5. Ever since the
demolishing analysis in Meese and Rogoff (1983), the apparent inability of funda-
mental variables to account for exchange rate movements has been puzzling
international economists. Indeed, Obsfeldt and Rogoff (2000) comment how this
apparent lack of «connection» between exchange rates and their fundamental
variables –the exchange rate disconnect puzzle– is one of the main open questions
in international macroeconomics.
This paper tries to contribute to the debate of exchange rate determinants by
looking at the behavior of exchange rates in Spain during the 18th century. Two
major factors make this period of time especially relevant. First, an extraordinary
development of the international capital markets –what Neal (2000, p. 117) has called
the new «financial architecture»– took place during that century. Simultaneously,
governments in European countries made a significant effort to bring stability to
their monetary systems. Starting in the late 17th century, and most notably from
1720 to 1790, European governments restricted their intervention in monetary affairs,
partly to avoid the inflationary episodes that previous interventions had inevitably
led to and partly because they found safer and more stable sources of financing6.
Pierre Vilar (1972, p. 378) aptly described the European monetary system of the
18th century: «there were no mutations, people were not betting on sudden
movements of the exchange rate and the outflows and inflows of currency were
clearly explained by the balances of payments».
Our choice of Spain proves especially relevant given the central role played
by this country in the international monetary and financial system during the
century. This privileged position came from its dominion over the main sources of
silver and quicksilver, and from a persistent trade deficit –a result of the enormous
volume of imports– that could be financed by a large increase of silver production
in Mexico7. Consequently, availability of accurate and up to date information on
the exchange rate of the Spanish currency became absolutely key for European
traders and merchants. It is not surprising, therefore, that the publications that
provided financial information devoted substantial attention to the exchange rates
of the Spanish currency. These services quoted market exchange rates –the rates
were calculated from the supply and demand of bills of exchange in the local
5 See Isard (1995), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) or Sarno and Taylor (2002).
6 See Bonney (ed.) (1995).
7 See Espina (2001).
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market– which can therefore be used as the building blocks of subsequent analyses
of exchange rate behavior.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
characteristics of the monetary system extant in Spain during the 18th century. This
description is necessary to understand the context in which the exchange rates
were determined. In Section 3 we review the sources used to construct our
exchange rate database. In Section 4 we carry out an empirical analysis of the
exchange rate data that attempts to explain their evolution throughout the century,
both in the historical context and in the context of formal models of exchange rate
determination. In Section 5 we offer some concluding comments.
2. THE SPANISH MONETARY SYSTEM, SILVER AND EXCHANGE RATES
The monetary reforms undertaken all over Europe during the late 17th and early
18th centuries had a more intense stabilizing effect on domestic monetary conditions
in Spain than in the rest of Europe. According to Hamilton (1988, p. 37) they also
contributed greatly to the smooth functioning of the international system. By 1680
those that postulated the necessity of radical reforms that would solve the rampant
inflation which resulted from the chaotic state of the monetary system seemed to be
winning the battle8. The pressing financial needs of the Spanish Hapsburgs had
forced them to continuously issue new vellón currency –an alloy of silver and
copper. This monetary expansion led to an unstoppable inflationary process, to the
disappearance of silver coins in circulation and to a significant premium on silver
over vellón9. In 1680, when this premium had reached 275 per cent, a series of
deflationary measures aimed at reintroducing silver currency into circulation were
undertaken: the nominal value of vellón was reduced by 50 per cent and the issuing
of copper currency with intrinsic value similar to its nominal value was permitted.
Later on, additional measures, more inflationary in nature but still aimed at the
reintroduction of silver currency, were implemented: in 1686 the weight of the newly
issued reales was reduced by 25 per cent while keeping their nominal value, and the
nominal value of silver coins was increased from 8 to 10 silver reales10. According
to most researchers, the full package of measures was quite effective. Vilar called it
a «surgical procedure», Domínguez Ortiz mentions how silver «abandoned its
hideout and went to the market again»11 and García de Paso (2000, pp. 72-73)
considered it key to understand the «end of monetary disorder in 17th century
Castile».
8 See García Guerra (2000, p. 34).
9 See Motomura (1994).
10 This 25 per cent revaluation of silver coins intended to attract individuals towards the mints.
11 Cfr. García de Paso (2000, pp. 72-73).
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Beyond the symbolic character of the reform, an important related consequence
was the acknowledgement by the Government of the existing pressures on metal
coins12. Gold, rather than silver, was in demand in 1680, mostly from merchants
involved in commerce with the colonies. According to García Cavallero, the
revaluation of gold decreed by the Government was key among the 1686 reforms,
given that merchants had already established a premium on gold over silver. Just
as with vellón, the Government acknowledged market forces «considering it
impossible to counter the People in the great importance given to gold and
conforming with trade practices»13. There seems to be little doubt that the
Government, when devaluing silver in favor of gold «was trying to keep the coinage
ratio in accordance to that in the market»14. The problem came with the subsequent
change in the bimetallic rate, that went from 15.45:1 prior to 1686 to 16.48:1
afterwards. According to Hamilton (1988, p. 54) this forced the rate farther from its
value in the rest of Europe, thus making Spanish silver more attractive.
 It is important to stress that the monetary reforms of the 1680s were exclusively
applied in peninsular mints (cecas or casas de moneda), not in the American
colonies15. Domestic monetary difficulties would therefore not be transferred to the
currency of the colonies, which was widely accepted in international markets. Spain
was thus following Holland or England in establishing a dual monetary system, with
a prestigious international currency and a solid domestic currency16. This system had
the disadvantage of duplicating the reference values, especially for international
trade. Bordázar (1736, p. 104) explains that «having increased the value of gold and
silver, it is to be expected that other nations will do the same, or that they will
differentiate the exchange rates of the old and the new silver». Bordázar himself
confirms that the most important international merchants were doing so as a current
practice. The difference between both currencies was around 25 per cent in 1736 –the
value established in 1686– and the preference for one or another depended on the
access that the merchants would have to each local market17. The problem, therefore,
could be quite efficiently solved by the market and by accounting practices18.
12 Muñoz de Amador (1755, p. 8) described it as «the most celebrated, which we still call
la Baxa de la Moneda (the fall of the currency)».
13 García Cavallero (1731, p. 225). Moreover, «the trade with the Reynos de las Indias
has introduced a Premium for the exchange of silver by gold, with merchants giving 8 and 10
percent, and sometimes even more, with the objective of avoiding increased expenses […] thus
turning their wealth to little volume and much value. Gold is bought with little thought, becoming
so demanded that no practical considerations can avoid its revaluation». Ibidem, p. 207.
14 Hamilton (1988, p. 53).
15 See Santiago (2003, p. 209).
16 Following Vilar (1972, p. 337).
17 «In trade the old silver is worth 25 per cent more than the new one. Old silver is used
in Cadiz and Seville whereas new silver is used in Madrid, Bilbao and San Sebastián. With
Amsterdam we trade in ducados of 357 maravedís and the ducado is divided in sueldos and
dineros. 1,138 ducados, 15 sueldos and 6 dineros from Cadiz or Seville are 3,131 florins, 12
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The arrival of the Bourbons at the beginning of the 18th century did not
drastically alter the monetary system, despite the fact that the pressing financial
needs of the Succession War woke up old inflationary temptations. Governments
managed to keep a stable and rational monetary system by favoring the unification
of the currencies used in the different peninsular areas, tightly controlling the
coinage and keeping the dual system. The defeat of the old kingdom of Aragon in
the Succession War gave Philip V the legitimacy to put an end to the overlapping
of several monetary systems within the country. Even though separate currencies
were kept for internal use, the coinage of currencies different from that of Castile
–which became the official national currency– was discontinued in 172419. At the
same time, the legal circulation of foreign currencies was prohibited. Coinage would
exclusively be carried out by the mints on behalf of the royal finance (Real Ha-
cienda), which would purchase the metal from individuals who, as a consequence,
lost the capacity to issue currency20. In order to exert a tighter control, the Treasury
General became in charge of appointing the officials for the mints and of covering
the coinage expenses while at the same time enjoying the seignorage21.
Philip V continued with the dual system based on a strong silver currency for
the external market and a weaker domestic currency. Starting in 1717, new reales
were coined for domestic use. These were called provincial silver (plata provin-
cial), different from the old reales or national silver (plata nacional), that could
be used in the Indias and Spain and which were the reference for international
trade22. The plata nacional was given superior status and the exchange rate
between the two was kept approximately at 75 per cent. This policy of a strong
trading currency attempted to avoid «the loss of international prestige of the real
de a ocho», in the words of Santiago (2003, p. 212). «The great volume and the
relative stability of the national currency gave it an unprecedented position of
privilege in international transactions all over the world»23. The only drawback of
this policy aimed at a strong currency was suffered by the American colonies, where
the demand for currency generated a recurrent scarcity of the precious metal24.
sueldos and 8 dineros in Amsterdam; the same 1,138 ducados, 15 sueldos and 6 dineros from
Madrid or Bilbao correspond to 2,548 florins». Bordázar (1736, pp. 99-100).
18 Hamilton is more critical of the dual system than Vilar. According to him, in the case
of Spain the dual silver system «accentuated the monetary confusion during a whole century».
Hamilton (1988, p. 70).
19 See Mateu (1955).
20 See Sardá (1948, p. 13).
21 See Santiago (2003, p. 215).
22 See Hamilton (1988, pp. 69, 87).
23 Hamilton (1988, p. 86).
24 Gelman (1987, pp. 485-486) explains this paradox of the scarcity of currency in the
American colonies and analyzes the mechanisms that colonial merchants used to obtain gold
and strong silver to be sent to Europe.
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The monetary policy of the Bourbons also maintained the inflows of gold into
Spain. In 1686 the relative value of gold was changed, with the intention of
adapting its legal status to market practices. The increased production of gold
coming from Brazil favored a reduction in both the international price and the
domestic legal values of gold in European countries. Spain, which had a world
monopoly on silver, was keen to attract gold, and kept the policy of overvaluation.
Between 1686 and 1772 the value of gold in Spain increased by 11.1 per cent, from
16.75:1 to 14.87:125.
This policy had the problem of reducing the domestic value of silver, with the
subsequent incentive to export it. The balance of payments deficit that Spain had
with the rest of the European countries was accentuated. The peso went through
several devaluations: according to Salvucci (1994, p. 132), in 1728 one peso
contained 24.82 grams of silver whereas after 1777 it only contained 24.44 grams,
thus having lost 1.5 per cent of its intrinsic value. This devaluation was explicitly
demanded by Spanish politicians that attempted to slow down the silver
«hemorrhage» that Spain was suffering26. Additionally, there were reasons of
economic opportunity. The increase in silver production in Mexico, added to the
stability of the price of silver in international markets, compensated for this
devaluation and led to an overvalued peso during the last thirty years of the 18th
century27.
The devaluation of the provincial silver currency, the one mainly used in Spain,
was more severe. The equivalent in grams of silver of the copper real de vellón
coined in the kingdom of Castile between 1688 and 1800 decreased by 29.5 per
25 See Marién (1788, I, pp. 38-41).The values in Hamilton (1988, pp. 54, 99) differ slightly,
but the trend is similar: 16.48:1 to 15.2:1, an 8.7 per cent revaluation, from 1686 to 1772.
Marién Hamilton
Spain Spain England France
1685 15.45
1686 16.75 16.48 15.39 14.91
1726 15.13 16
1728 16 15.06 15.2 14.6
1730 15.06
1737 15.06
1772 14.88 15.03 15.2 14.63
1779 15.8
1786 16 16.61 15.2 15.5
26 It was a recurring metaphor in economic literature to compare silver to «blood» that
the body, Spain, was constantly losing. Solutions proposed went from purely monetarist to
increased confidence in commercial activities and a reduction of the balance of payments
deficit. However, the accepted view was that something explicit had to be done to stop the
ouflow of silver. Stein (1989), Sardá (1988).
27 See Salvucci (1994, p. 137).
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cent. This reduction was not uniformly carried out throughout the century. The
real lost 20.1 per cent of its value between 1688 and 1708; 5.6 per cent between
1708 and 1738; 3.4 per cent between 1738 and 1778 and, finally, 0.4 per cent between
1778 and 180028. Thus, the largest devaluations of provincial silver took place during
the early decades of the century.
The limited scope of these devaluations was underscored by Sardá (1948, pp.
17-20), who maintained that the Bourbons did not really carry out a policy aimed
at stopping the outflows of metal but had fiscal considerations in mind. According
to him, the control that the royal finance exerted on the mints encouraged the
Government to use the devaluations as a means to increasing fiscal revenues. The
Crown did not want to increase the fees paid in the cecas or give up seignorage.
Thus, the 1728 devaluation, which implied one more real per mark, was devoted
to favoring the mint officials and to financing technical improvements in the coinage
process. The secret devaluations carried out in 1771 and 1786 were intended mainly
to finance the technical upgrading of the Spanish mint29.
The Spanish monetary system went through a major breakthrough in 1780 with
the introduction of fiduciary money guaranteed by the Government, a process
studied by Herr (1977). In order to finance the expenditures of the war against
Great Britain, the Government authorized the issuing of paper money (vales rea-
les) for a given nominal amount. The first issue of vales amounted to a nominal
value of 600 pesos, and would pay an interest rate of 4 per 100. More vales were
issued in the following years, reaching a total nominal value of 450 million reales.
This led to a depreciation of the vales up to 22 per cent. Once the war was over,
confidence in the vales was restored, and from 1786 on they were exchanged at 1
per cent or 2 per cent above nominal value. We do not know the impact that this
increase in fiduciary money had over the total monetary supply, but in any case
the market reacted in a positive manner to the creation of paper money, at least
until 1794. In this year a new war started and between 1794 and 1799 new vales
reales were issued for a nominal value of 1,762 million reales, which quickly led to
sharp depreciation30.
In general, therefore, the Spanish monetary system evolved during the 18th
century towards increased stability and uniformity. The new monetary order
favored the existence of a strong international currency, although a scarcity was
generated in the colonies. The outflows of silver, originally caused by the recurring
28 According to Feliu (1991, p. 20).
29 See Santiago (2003, p. 217).
30 In July 1799, when the discount on vales reales was already 40 per cent, they were
recognized as a «true currency» with a discount of 6 per cent. Attempts by the Government
to withdraw the paper money from the market were ineffective, and in the subsequent years
until 1807 the discount stayed at around 50 per cent. Data from Herr (1978, p. 123).
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trade balance deficit, were accentuated by the interest to attract gold towards Spain
and the Indies. After intense interventions by the Government in monetary issues
in the first half of the century, an improvement in the trade deficit and an increased
inflow of silver towards the metropolis significantly reduced the need for
intervention. The monarch had to adapt to market forces more frequently than he
would have desired. In the confrontation between him and the merchants –who
usually would have opposite needs– there was still much margin for market forces.
The conclusion stemming from this brief analysis of the monetary reforms in
18th century Spain seems to be that most of the reforms were consequences of
pressures on the exchange rate –i.e., the relative prices of currencies given their
metallic content– and not vice versa. This supports the thesis that the value of
quoted exchange rates was more a result of economic forces than of government
intervention in the exchanges, which was somehow more reactive than proactive.
A closer look at the way Spanish exchange rates were quoted during that period
would therefore clarify and strengthen our analysis, and this we do in the following
section.
3. THE COURSE OF EXCHANGE, THE LLOYD’S LIST AND THE SPANISH
EXCHANGE RATE
The exchange rate data that we use in this paper come from two British
publications from the 18th century: The Lloyd’s List and the Course of the
Exchange31. These periodicals offered abundant financial and commercial
information, and so they have become a well-known source used by numerous
researchers to analyze issues related to 18th century finance and economics32.
The research done so far has focused on the main financial and commercial
marketplaces –Amsterdam, London and Paris– but the Spanish markets have been
severely neglected. This lack of attention to markets that were in fact very active
is to be stressed, since one of the main elements of financial markets is the
importance of arbitrage and their inherent multilateral character33. At the same time,
the relevance that Spain had in European trade –especially with Great Britain–
gives to this country a prominent role in the economic context of the period.
The mentioned lack of interest in Spain contrasts sharply with the importance
that the data sources themselves attached to the Spanish exchange rates: Spain was
31 We have consulted the collection of The Lloyd’s List of the University of Leicester, and
that of the Course of the Exchange at the British Library.
32 Among others, McCusker (1992), Neal (1990), and Schneider et al. (1991).
33 This has been argued by Schubert (1989), Quinn (1996), and Michie (1998), among
others.
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the country with the largest number of cities listed in both publications. This pre-
dominance increased significantly during the last years of the century. At the beginning
of the century three out of seventeen European cities listed were Spanish –Bilbao, Cádiz
and Madrid. By the end of the hundred-year period, the Spanish cities listed were five
or six out of a total of twenty five and, at some points, as many as eight –San
Sebastián, Corunha, Barcelona, Seville, Málaga and Gibraltar had been added.
Similarly, this neglect of Spanish cities does not parallel the strategic role played
by Spain in the international capital markets. All financial intermediaries needed to
be well aware of the behavior of the main Spanish markets in order to provide
customers with that information. By including an ever increasing number of Spanish
cities, the British press was just reflecting the pressing demand by British financial
intermediaries of up to date and accurate information on the Spanish position.
The main Spanish markets on which exchange rates were quoted in the British
press were Madrid, Cádiz and Bilbao. Madrid and Cádiz were quoted from the very
first issue in 1699; Bilbao was added in May 1714. The quotes were maintained
until 1826, and were only discontinued momentarily during years of war involving
Spain and Great Britain –namely, in 1702-1713, 1797-1801 and 1810-1813. This
interest for the three Spanish cities was related to their importance in the Spanish
commercial and financial structure, but also to their position in international trade
with Europe and America. All three cities shared a markedly international character
in their financial and commercial operations, acting as intermediaries for the
settlement of balances between Spanish and foreign markets34. Given that a
significant proportion of Spanish imports were balanced in those three cities, it
was key that information on those cities be provided accurately and speedily.
Studies on the internal Spanish market show that other cities used one of these
three in their clearing operations, as it was the case of Barcelona with Madrid35.
Spanish exchange rates reflected the behavior of the main Spanish markets in
their particular relation to the City, so they did not strictly reflect the evolution of
the domestic market. Exchange rate quotations and movements were determined
by the market of bills of exchange. In 1780, Luis de Luque (1780, p. 105) explained
the exchange rate in Cádiz by noting that «the price of exchange increases or
decreases depending on the context and on the abundance, or scarcity, of bills
drawn on that city». We find this idea again in 1793, when the editors of a Spanish
publication, the Correo Mercantil, explained volatility of exchange rates:
«sometimes there is an abundance of people who want to send money to
a city and sometimes of those who want to receive it. In the first case it is
natural that the exchange rate will decrease and in the second case it will
34 «Spanish merchants that import goods issue bills against Madrid, Cádiz and Bilbao,
which is where the Spaniards pay». Marién (1788, I, p. 32). Italics added.
35 See Maixé (2001).
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increase, because in this, as in everything, abundance depreciates and
scarcity appreciates»36.
Spanish exchange rates would, therefore, reflect the market of bills of exchange
between London and each city and not the evolution of the domestic market. It has
to be stressed that there was a generalized consensus that the relative price of the
currencies was given by the supply and demand of both –or, equivalently, of bills of
exchange– and therefore that the exchange rate quotes were mainly market driven.
Discrepancies among the different Spanish cities were, in fact, quite small:
Considerations of risk and time lags in the clearing of operations would lead to small
differences in the rates. Also, the different cities had slightly different procedures
for the payment of debts. For example, bills drawn from London on Madrid and Bil-
bao had a fourteen day courtesy period after maturity, whereas those on Cádiz only
had six37. However, the correlation of across-city exchange rate variations –significantly
above 0.5 for both Madrid-Cádiz and Madrid-Bilbao– points at a high synchronicity
throughout the complete century. Furthermore, the average degree of discrepancy
was below 1.17 per cent in the case of Madrid-Cádiz and below 1.77 per cent for
Madrid-Bilbao, having been on average even smaller during the second half of the
century38. That is, Spanish financial markets behaved much similarly with respect to
London throughout the 18th century, and the existing discrepancies tended to
disappear. This tendency came to a sudden stop in the 19th century, as data from the
first three decades of the century show. Einzing (1962, p. 175), based on information
from British periodicals, pointed at intense variations in exchange rates among the
different Spanish cities in 1893 and measured that discrepancy –which he attributed
to increased insecurity and risks of robbery– in more than eight per cent.
The City, therefore, showed throughout the 18th century an extraordinary
interest in accurate information on the Spanish financial centers. The British
periodicals, however, did not specify the type of currency that was being quoted,
probably because that was common knowledge among merchants and bankers,
who were the main audience of the publication39. The evidence suggests that the
36 Correo Mercantil de España y sus Indias (31-1-1793), p. 68.
37 See Marién (1788, II, p. 59).
38 See Torres et al. (2003).
39 Spain used three types of currencies for international trade: the silver doblón, that was
worth 32 reales of old silver; the silver peso, worth 8 reales of old silver, and the silver
ducado, equivalent to 11 reales plus 1 maravedí of old silver. These currencies were not used
indistinctly in European cities, but tradition had led to preferences depending on the trading
area. Thus, the silver peso was used when moving capital to London, Lisbon, Genoa or Liorna.
The silver doblón was used with Paris and the silver ducado was used for relationships with
Amsterdam and Hamburg. This regional specialization remained until the end of the 18th century.
When trade was established with new areas —Russia, Prussia or Sweden— the currency chosen
was that of the market that functioned as intermediary —i.e., Amsterdam, and the silver
ducado. See Marién (1788, II, p.121).
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exchange rate was quoted in pence per silver peso40. This conclusion is confirmed
by the examination of manuals for merchants. In one of them, that of Savall (1778,
p. 161), we find the quote «Londres gives 39 dineros and a half on Cadiz and
Madrid for one peso of 8 reales of old silver»; similarly, Marién (1788, I, p. 7)
mentions that «in London, a silver peso is exchanged for 37 sterling pence». These
figures are quite close to the average value of the exchange rate on all Spanish
cities that we obtain for the whole 18th century: 38.39241.
In any case, the exchange rates quoted in the City were determined by the
market of bills of exchange drawn on each of the different Spanish cities. Of course,
there was a limit for this market-driven floating of the rate. This limit would
correspond to the gold point of the different currencies and to the different attempts
by the governments to change the nominal of the currency. However, within that
range, it seems that indeed quotes on Spanish rates depended directly on the
economic variables behind the market for bills of exchange. This context, therefore,
provides a much appropriate setting for the analysis of the relationship of the
exchange rates to relevant economic fundamentals. We go on to this analysis in
the following section.
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE XVIII CENTURY AS A TESTING GROUND FOR
EXCHANGE RATE MODELS
In this section we analyze the exchange rate between the Spanish and the British
currencies –pesos and pence respectively– in the 18th century42. We first describe
the behavior of these rates by means of a simple graphical analysis, trying to
identify the periods determined by different economic contexts. We then describe
the formal models that we build upon, and the econometric methodology used in
order to analyze the relationship between 18th century exchange rates and economic
fundamentals. We present some of the additional data collected on relevant variables
–or closest proxies available–, and mention the sources of the data. Finally we
present the results of the estimation. We also comment on the limitations of the
analysis, which point at directions for future research.
40 The other equivalences of the old silver peso were as such: it was worth a quarter of a
silver doblón or 272 old silver maravedís; in terms of copper (vellón), to 512 maravedís de
vellón, or 15 reales and 2 maravedís de vellón, or 128 cuartos.
41 We would like to thank the referees for asking us to specify the currency unit to which
the quoted exchange rates referred.
42 «A sterling pound was composed of 20 shillings, each of which corresponded to 12
pence. One pound was equivalent to 95 Spanish reales plus 22 maravedíes de vellón. A Spanish
peso was equivalent to 15 reales plus 2 maravedíes de vellón» Marién (1788, I, p. 139).
London exchange rates on Spanish cities were quoted in pence, so at the time that Marién
wrote 36 pence were needed to buy a Spanish peso.
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4.1. Evolution of Spanish Exchange Rates in London
We show in Figure 1 the evolution of the monthly exchange rate during the
complete 18th century. The rates are quoted in pence per peso and we use the
three longest series available, those for Madrid, Cádiz and Bilbao. Discontinuities
in the series correspond to periods of war between the two countries, when the
rates would not be quoted.
The graph shows at first sight a constant appreciation of the pence against
the peso during the 18th century, a trend that only reverses in the last years of the
century. At the end of the 17th century, the exchange rate on Madrid and Cádiz
was around 53 pence per peso. From this maximum value, that was never achieved
again, the Spanish peso began a downslide that continued throughout the century:
the exchange rate on all three Spanish cities had decreased to less than 39 pence
per peso halfway through the century43. This appreciation of the British currency
was especially intense during 1720-1739, peaceful years that witnessed a
continuous increase in economic linkages between Spain and Great Britain and
the Spanish devaluation of silver at the end of the 1720s. During the first forty
years of the century, exchange rates on Spanish cities decreased by 30 per cent,
reaching a level of 40 pence per peso. The following years brought some stability.
This was a consequence of the notable decrease in trade between Great Britain
and Spain –the constant appreciation of the sterling pound seemed to slow down–
and of the War of Succession and the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-1748). As a matter
of fact, during these war periods the peso only lost an average of 0.9 per cent in
the three main cities. The stability period extended until 1777, at which time the
cumulative depreciation of the peso was only a 1.2 per cent with respect to 1739.
Notice that we have stressed especially the relationship between the bilateral trade
and the exchange rates, even though later we will attribute much of the peso
depreciation in these years to inflation differentials. The relationship between the
bilateral trade balance and the exchange rate, even though present during the whole
century, is much more noticeable at the end of the century. It is in those last years
when the bilateral trade becomes much more volatile and so does its effect on the
exchange rate.
The tendency of the peso to depreciate accelerated again after 1777. Whereas
previous war periods seemed to have had a positive effect on the peso –mainly
because of the reduction induced in trade with Great Britain, which eliminated the
deficit and the pressure for exchange rate depreciation– the new conflict
strengthened the pound. Between 1777 and 1785 the peso lost an average of 14.2
per cent in the three Spanish cities, bringing the cumulative depreciation to 55.8
43 Annual data on these three cities can be accessed in the working paper version of this
article (http://www.unav.es/econom/investigacion/working/wp1204.pdf).
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per cent with respect to the levels prevailing at the beginning of the century: in
1785 the peso was exchanged for 34.2 pence. The war against Portugal and the
subsequent war with Great Britain (1777-1783), added to the American War of
Independence, paralyzed the Atlantic-based economic relationships. Spanish ties
with the colonies were severed, and the Government was forced to issue fiduciary
money (vales reales) starting in 1780. This was severely penalized by the City,
and the peso depreciated intensely, especially in the years 1784 and 1785. Ironically,
by this time the wars were already over and capital was flowing back to Spain
from America.
Between 1785 and 1792 economic conditions and trade relationships were
especially favorable, and the tendency for the peso to depreciate was reversed. In
that eight year period the exchange rate of the Spanish currency appreciated by 6
per cent. Again, the effect of the bilateral trade balance can be seen here, since it
is in these years when the Spanish trade deficit starts to improve significantly
(see also Figure 3).
In 1792 a new war cycle began and the subsequent massive increase in public
debt to finance the war expenses –new vales reales were issued– changed the
trend again and threw the exchange rate into a free fall that lasted from 1792 to
1806. During those years the exchange rate depreciated by 79.9 per cent and it
was not until a new alliance was established between Spain and Great Britain that
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Sources: See text.
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The immediate question arises as to the economic causes of this evolution of
the exchange rate, especially in regards to the relationship with economic
fundamentals. Was this evolution that we have just superficially described linked
to the values of economic variables? In order to give some visual evidence, we
present in Figures 2 to 4 the evolution of prices –more exactly, inflation rates–,
the Spain-Great Britain trade balance and relative money supplies44.
The first significant finding, in line with the subsequent statistical analysis,
relates inflation rates and the theory of relative purchasing power parity (Subsection
4.2). There is only one period during which the inflation rates of both countries
are significantly different, namely 1720-1755. It is noticeable in Figure 2 how during
those years the Spanish inflation rate was consistently above that in Great Britain.
Purchasing power parity considerations would imply that the peso should steadily
depreciate in order to compensate for those inflation differentials, if no real shocks
were present. As we have seen above, this is indeed the case. In fact, when the
inflation rates equalize around 1755 –this trend continues during the rest of the
sample period– the depreciation of the peso stops and the exchange rate stabilizes.
The bilateral trade was basically balanced during those years (see Figure 3),
therefore the exchange rate seemed to be entirely PPP-driven: the relative price of
the two currencies would move in order to compensate inflation differentials and
keep the relative prices –the real exchange rate– constant. The reason for these
inflation differentials can be found in the evolution of our measure of relative
money supplies, which is seen to increase significantly –money supply in Spain
increased relative to that in Great Britain– during the first half of the century. Why
the subsequent decrease in the relative money supplies did not lead to a significant
appreciation of the peso should be explained in terms of the higher growth of real
activity in Great Britain during the second half of the century45.
We now turn to the bilateral trade balance between Spain and Great Britain.
Here the evidence is again quite revealing. During the earlier years, almost until
1787, trade between the two countries was basically balanced, and no significant
deficits or surpluses persisted over long periods. We noted before, though, that
a (small) chronic deficit between 1750 and 1770 may have accentuated the exchange
rate depreciation during years when the inflation rates were already equalized.
However, it is noticeable that, starting in 1787, trade between the two countries
becomes increasingly unstable, with large Spanish surpluses being followed by
44 Inflation rates have been smoothed with a moving average since they present quite a
volatile behavior during the sample period. Subsection 4.3 describes the sources and construction
of the variables used in the analysis.
45 It was mentioned in Section 2 that the amount of silver in the peso changed significantly
throughout the century. This nominal depreciation of the Spanish currency was, however,
insufficient to explain the secular depreciation of the exchange rate, so we believe that the
inflation differential story is still consistent with the data.
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large deficits. We mentioned earlier some possible causes for this instability. If
the evolution of the trade balance in the years 1790-1830 is compared with that of
the exchange rates, the parallelism is noteworthy. There is a textbook-like inverse
relationship between the two series: Trade surpluses came hand in hand with
currency appreciations and vice versa. Thus, in a period with stable relative money
supplies and comparable inflation rates, the value of the exchange rate seemed to
be driven by another fundamental variable, the trade balance. Given that inflation
rates were similar, the implication is that the nominal exchange rate was affecting
the real exchange rate –the relative prices in the two countries– which therefore
experienced large swings until 1819. The causes for these fluctuations in the real
exchange rate rest most likely on real shocks on the production side, differentials
in output growth or productivity, or cost related shocks. These would most likely
be a consequence of the profound changes in the production side that Great
Britain was experiencing at the turning of the century.
Finally, Figure 4 shows our proxy for the relative money supply defined as the
logarithm of the ratio of money supplies in Spain and Great Britain. As we can
see, this proxy presents negative values during the sample period which indicate
that at the beginning of our period of analysis the money supply in Great Britain
was greater than that in Spain. The subsequent increase in the relative money
supply in Spain is parallel to the inflation differentials shown in Figure 2 and thus
the information in the figure is perfectly consistent with our previous comments.
In the second half of the century relative money supplies seem to stabilize, and
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FIGURE 3
BILATERAL TRADE BALANCE SPAIN-GREAT BRITAIN
Sources: See text.
FIGURE 4
PROXY FOR (LOG) RATIOS OF MONEY SUPPLY
Sources: See text.
EXCHANGE RATE BEHAVIOR IN THE 18th CENTURY
161
Our previous analysis has provided us with preliminary evidence that the
exchange rate was significantly linked to the evolution of some economic
fundamentals during the complete century. We review now some theoretical models
of exchange rate determination that link the exchange rate to economic variables.
These models will be the basis of the econometric analysis in Subsection 4.4.
4.2. Alternative Theories of Exchange Rate Determination
The two macroeconomic theories of exchange rate determination that are the
focus of our empirical analysis are the purchasing power parity and the monetary
model of the exchange rate46.
PPP and the Monetary Model of the Exchange Rate
The purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis, though hinted at in the 1500s,
was first formally stated in the 17th and 18th centuries. PPP states that the exchange
rate between two currencies should be that which would equate the relative national
prices if expressed in a common currency47. Thus, if Et is the exchange rate between
two currencies –expressed in units of currency of country A per unit of currency
of country B– and PAt and P
B
t are the price levels in the two countries, PPP states
that E1=P1
A/PBt. Given the arbitrariness of the base year for price levels, PPP is
usually stated in relative form, which implies that the changes in the exchange
rate should exactly offset the changes in relative prices. In other words, the rate























Notice that taking logarithms of both absolute and relative PPP and using that
log (1+x) ≈ x for small x, we obtain the linearized versions, which are most




46 Other theories of exchange rate determination such as liquidity models, the portfolio
balance model or micro-foundations based theories can be consulted in the comprehensive
review by Sarno and Taylor (2002).
47 See Froot and Rogoff (1995), Rogoff (1996) and Sarno and Taylor (2002) for surveys
on the PPP hypothesis.
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B) → Det = ptA – ptB [2]
where lowercase letters correspond to the logarithm of the variable and pt
i is the
inflation rate in country i. Notice that PPP is by definition a relationship between
monetary variables that move in the proportion necessary to keep all real varia-
bles constant. More specifically, defining the real exchange rate as the ratio of
the price levels in the different countries –this is a relative price, and therefore a
real variable usually taken as a measure of relative competitiveness of the products
of the two countries– relative PPP says that the real exchange rate between two
countries will be constant. Thus, deviations from PPP correspond to changes in
the real exchange rate, and therefore to changes in the real side of the economy.
As it is, PPP just states that, the real side being constant, the exchange rate should
move to keep the relative prices in the two countries constant48.
During the 1970s the monetary model of the exchange rate emerged as the
dominant framework for nominal exchange rate determination49. Since the exchange
rate between two currencies is the relative price of foreign and domestic money,
this price should be determined by the relative supply and demand for these
moneys. Thus, the first element of the model must be some structure for the money
demand functions in two countries. These are specified to depend on the nominal











where mt is the money supply, pt is the price level, it is the nominal interest rate,
and yt is the real output. All variables refer to period t and, with the exception of
the nominal interest rates, the lowercase letters denote levels in logarithms. Note
that the money demand parameters a1 and a2 are assumed to be identical across
countries.




where et is the nominal exchange rate. Solving [1] and [2] for pt
A and pt
B and








48 The main conclusion from recent testing of the PPP hypothesis is that PPP is a valid
long run parity condition when applied to exchange rates among major industrialized countries.
See Sarno and Taylor (2002).
49 See Frenkel (1976), and/or Mussa (1976).
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which makes the equilibrium value of the exchange rate a function of relative money
supplies, the interest rate spread and relative real output.
As it can be seen, this model is quite general. The only structural relationship
assumed is that the (real) demand for money in each country depends on the
nominal interest rate and real output. Notice that this formula conveys the
conventional relationships that (i) monetary expansions in the country are
associated with a depreciation of the exchange rate whereas (ii) real growth is
associated with an appreciation of the exchange rate. The influence of the interest
rate, however, is contrary to the usual wisdom that an increase in the interest rate
tends to appreciate the currency, given that the model abstracts from capital flows50.
Why, then, the PPP and the Monetary Model?
Cassel (1918) coined the term «purchasing power parity» (PPP) in order to
identify the relationship between exchange rates and price levels, although the
perception that exchange rates must be related to national price levels has been
dated back to the 16th century, in particular to the School of Salamanca in Spain51.
The genesis of this perception was linked to the development of the quantity
theory of money: «In places where money is scarce, goods will be cheaper than in
those where the whole mass of money is bigger, and therefore it is lawful to
exchange a smaller sum in one country for a larger sum in another»52. Notice that
a monetary model explanation is already present in that quotation, given the
reference to relative money supplies. Thus, it seemed that already in those early
years the idea that prices were the result of market equilibrium relationships was
accepted, and so the exchange rate was naturally interpreted as the relative market
price of two currencies.
Presumably, the discovery and relevance of these theories was catalyzed in
those early years by the significant impact that large inflows of precious metals
–gold and silver coming from America, which Spain was the first European country
to receive– had on money supplies and on national prices53. These inflows
50 Empirical evidence beyond the late 1970s in the monetary model ceases to provide a
good explanation of variations in exchange rate data (see Meese and Rogoff, 1983). Some
authors have sought to explain this breakdown on the grounds of econometric misspecification,
while others have argued that large current account deficits or surpluses during the period
examined generated important wealth effects which are not adequately captured by the model.
See Frankel (1986) and Sarno and Taylor (2002).
51 See Grice-Hutchinson (1952); Einzing (1962); Officer (1982), and Isard (1995).
52 Stated in 1594 by Domingo de Ibáñez, as quoted in Officer (1982, p. 32), and Grice-
Hutchinson (1952, pp. 57-8).
53 See Isard (1995, p. 57) on this point.
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represented an immediate increase in the availability of money –which existed still
mostly in the form of coins– and therefore in the money supply within the country.
Given that most transactions in the different currencies were driven by trade, the
demand for currency depended directly on real output or income –that measures
the amount of transactions that take place within the country– and, quite
significantly, on the amount of trade between the two countries. The bills of
exchange were for all purposes a claim on a country’s national currency. The
interest rate, on the other hand, probably played a small role in this demand for
money during those years, both from a domestic and from an international point
of view. Thus, we expect the monetary model in the 18th century to provide a good
explanation for the exchange rate behavior, although we would express it in a






















where, of course, TBt
A-B = Exportst
A→B – Exportst
B→A is the bilateral trade balance,
the formula again reflects the conventional wisdom that a positive trade balance
tends to appreciate the currency54.
Consequently, we believe that the use of data from a period when there was no
significant speculative behavior in the foreign exchange market and when the exchange
rate was quoted as the result of market forces has the potential of uncovering
relationships that may not be so apparent –or for which very long time series may be
needed– from the analysis of recent data. Of course, the drawback is the lack of good
quality data, as will become clear from our description of the data available.
4.3. The data
We have collected as comprehensive a database as possible on Spanish and
British macroeconomic variables during the years going from 1700 to 1819. Our
data are available only at the annual frequency, except for the exchange rate itself.
54 Notice that the form of the money demands in [3] and [4] is not justified, although
similar demands can be derived from more formal models. Our modifications in [3b] and [4b]
must be understood as purely ad hoc, and assuming, among other things, the existence of only
two countries. However, given that exports are a component of output in both countries, the
appearance of the trade balance in equation [6b] is natural, considering that the output variable
is net of Great Britain-Spain trade.
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For the analysis of the models in Subsection 4.2 we use the following varia-
bles:
– The price level for Great Britain, Pt
GB corresponds to the consumer goods
component of the Schumpeter-Gilboy Prices Indices, available from Mitchell
(1988).
– Et is the exchange rate, in pence per peso, between Spain and Great Britain.
We built a database of exchange rates collecting monthly end-of-period
observations of the rates quoted in London for different Spanish cities,
obtained from the Lloyd’s List and the Course of the Exchange. We use the
longest series available –the exchange rate versus the city of Cádiz, at that
time the main commercial port in Spain– and transform the monthly rates
into annual using the yearly average.
– The quantity of money in Spain, Mt
Sp is proxied as the cumulative sum of the
value of silver and gold –in millions of piastres– that entered Spain starting
in 1700. The data come from Morineau (1985).
– Similarly, the quantity of money in Great Britain, Mt
GB is proxied as the
cumulative sum of the value of coinage –silver and gold, in thousands of sterling
pounds– issued from 1690 to 1820. The data come from Mitchell (1988)55.
– The trade balance between the two countries TBt
Sp-GB has been calculated as
the total value of exports from Spain to Great Britain minus the total value of
imports. The source, in this case, is Prados (1984, p. 160).
–Real output in both countries, Yt
Sp and Yt
GB, has been proxied by government
revenue from income taxes deflated by the price indices. Data on government
revenue come from Mitchell (1988) and Merino (1987). We are aware of the
coarseness of this proxy, but there is usually a fairly high correlation between
output or national income and government revenue, and so we opted for
using it56.
We have tried to incorporate alternative proxy variables for income and interest
rates, but these are either not currently available for a long enough period or the
proxy yielded unreasonable results57. Thus, our version of the monetary model
will only include differential money supplies, differential real output, and the bila-
teral trade balance.
55 An ideal proxy variable for money in Spain and Great Britain would include paper currency
and bank deposits. The data for these two concepts are, however, unavailable.
56 An alternative proxy for income is the total volume of trade, defined as the sum of
exports plus imports. Unfortunately, we have not been able to find comparable data for both
countries on total trade.
57 For interest rates, only Great Britain has a series of bond yields available, and so we
opted for not including it given the lack of an equivalent variable for Spain.
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4.4 The Empirical Evidence of PPP and the Monetary Model
We perform now a formal testing of the models outlined in Subsection 4.2.
The first model, PPP, states that there should be a long-run relationship
between the exchange rate and the price levels of the two countries. Given the
way we measure our exchange rate, the relationship becomes et = pt
GB – pt
Sp. Notice
that this hypothesis also implies relative PPP, or that exchange rate movements
should compensate for inflation rate differentials across the two countries.
For the monetary model, the long run relationship that we estimate is






so that we expect a negative coefficient in the equilibrium relationship of money
differentials, and a positive coefficient of both the trade balance and output
differentials. We have mentioned before why we do not expect the interest rate to
be a significant determinant of money demand, and therefore we decided to
eliminate it from equation [7]. Our version of the long run monetary model therefore







Given that the main variables involved in both long run relationships are
integrated variables, the correct methodology to be used for the analysis is co-
integration. We use Johansen’s methodology to detect the existence of a long-
run relationship and to estimate the parameters of the relationship. Further details
on the methodology can be found in Hamilton (1996).
Results for the testing of PPP appear in Table 1 (co-integration test) and Table
2 (parameter estimates). The results of the co-integration test in Table 1 are indeed
very supportive of the PPP hypothesis. There is significant statistical evidence at
the 1 per cent confidence level of one single co-integration vector between the
exchange rate and the price indices of both countries58. We then proceeded to
estimate the full error correction model. Results of this estimation appear in Table
259. The results are quite encouraging, although we do not comment on the com-
plete set of parameters, but only on the parameters of the error correction term.
These coefficients measure the extent to which each variable reacts to deviations
from the implied equilibrium relationship. The coefficients on the price indices are
58 Both the trace and the maximum-eigenvalue tests agree. The normalized co-integration
vector, that characterizes the long-run equilibrium relationship is quite close to (1,1,-1), which
is the value implied by PPP. The coefficient on the British price index is a little too high, but
this may be due to the different base year of the two indices. When a constant is included in
the co-integrating equation, the coefficients are not statistically different from the PPP-implied
(1,1,-1). We have decided to keep the test as it is, for easiness of interpretation.
59 The number of lags in the distributed lag dynamic specification have been determined by
the lags in the co-integration test (4). For more detailed results of the estimation see Torres
et al. (2004).
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not significantly different from zero, indicating that the movements in prices do
not seem to be related to the equilibrium relationship, and are mainly caused by
other factors, including some dependence on their own past –coefficients of the
lagged terms. However, the adjustment term for the exchange rate is statistically
significant and has the right negative sign: when the equilibrium relationship does
not hold, for example when the value of the deviation is positive, the exchange
rate tends to go down in order to move the system towards the equilibrium rate.
The magnitude of the coefficient is small, indicating that the exchange rate moves
slowly towards its equilibrium value. Consequently, there is significant evidence
that the PPP hypothesis held, in the long run, in the exchange rate between Spain
and Great Britain in the first ninety years of the 18th century60.
60 This is in line with prior evidence that movements of the exchange rate towards the
PPP value, when significant, are quite slow. See Lothian and Taylor (1996), and Rogoff (1996).
TABLE 2
RESTRICTED ESTIMATION OF ECM FOR THE PPP HYPOTHESIS, 1718-1819*,**
D(Ex. Rate) D(Price Sp) D(Price Eng)
Error Correction -0.0023  0.0017  0.0019
Term *** (-1.83) ( 0.38) ( 0.96)
 R-squared  0.26  0.15  0.23
 Adj. R-squared  0.13  0.002  0.09
Notes:
*  For detailed results on the restricted estimation of ECM for PPP see Torres et al. (2004).
* * Co-integrating vector restricted to satisfy PPP: (1,1,-1).
*** t-stats in parentheses.
TABLE 1
UNRESTRICTED CO-INTEGRATION FOR THE PPP HYPOTHESIS, 1718-1819*
Unrestricted Co-integrating Coefficients:
Exchange Rate Price Spain Price England
-8.43 -11.21 16.72
1 Co-integrating Equation (Normalized co-integrating coefficients):  **




* For detailed results on the trace and Max-Eigen tests see Torres et al. (2004).
* * t-stats in parentheses.
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The estimation of the co-integration model above is done with data from 1700 to
1790: years after 1790 cannot be used because of the discontinuities in the exchange
rate data61. We mentioned above that during those years inflation rates differed
considerably in the period 1700-1750, whereas they were very similar during the
second half of the century. The exchange rate perfectly mimicked the behavior of
inflation differentials, which in turn responded to relative money supplies. In that
sense, we find a significant relationship of changes in the exchange rate with relative
money supplies62. Of course, the evidence in the last years of the sample would not be
supportive of PPP, since we observe similar inflation rates –some fluctuations are still
noticeable– but the exchange rate fluctuated quite wildly. We have already commented
how these swings in the exchange rate –and the changes in the real exchange rate
that this would induce– parallel the behavior of the bilateral trade balance.
We examine now whether the exchange rate reacted to movements in other
fundamental variables by using the data on relative quantities of money, output
differentials and the trade balance between the two countries63.
The results of the estimation of this ad hoc monetary model are shown in
Tables 3 and 4. As we can see, there is some evidence of a long run relationship
among the variables –co-integration tests are shown in Table 464. The tests suggest
the presence of one long run equilibrium relationship. The results point at a
relationship of the exchange rate with these three fundamentals, although one
puzzling result appears. The relative money supply term has the opposite sign to
what we would expect, whereas the signs of the trade balance and the output
differentials are correct. That is, trade surpluses in Spain tended to appreciate the
exchange rate, and vice versa. Also, fast economic growth in Spain would tend to
appreciate the exchange rate vis à vis the British currency. So far, these results are
encouraging and, keeping in mind the limitations of the analysis, seem to suggest
that exchange rates significantly reacted to fundamental variables in the way we
would expect from theoretical considerations.
We do not have, however, an immediately intuitive explanation for the opposite
sign of the money differential variable. It has to be said that the estimation of this
61 In the estimation of the PPP and monetary model we do not take into account a possible
structural break in 1797 —the bank restriction period— , due to the fact that our sample
period ends in 1790.
62 See Torres et al. (2004) for a more detailed estimation of changes in the exchange rate
versus money supply during the period 1701-1805.
63 The collection and use in the statistical analysis of a better proxy for output differentials
and one for interest rates becomes a priority for future research. Also, having complete series
that cover the entire 18th century would allow for a much more thorough test of the relationship
of the exchange rate to fundamentals. As it is now, and with no known sources available to
complete the data, the graphical analysis seems to be quite supportive of a fundamental-driven
exchange rate, but statistical evidence is only weakly supportive.
64 For detailed results of the estimation of the monetary model see Torres et al. (2004).
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model is done exclusively on data prior to 1800, and in fact the number of included
observations is quite restricted by the availability of data on the proxy for real
output. When we take out this variable from the system, the sign of the money
variable becomes the correct one and that of the trade balance becomes negative.
These effects are no doubt caused by the small number of observations –half
those available for the testing of PPP– which makes co-integration estimates too
unstable. Also, and given the evidence in favor of the effect of the trade balance
in the last years of the sample, but knowing that we cannot include those data
because of the discontinuities of the exchange rate series, we place considerable
caution on the results in Tables 3 and 4 –as in other analyses that we have not
included but are available from the authors.
To sum up, the PPP hypothesis holds quite reasonably in 18th century Spain.
Movements in relative prices can explain exchange rate fluctuations in the early
18th century, especially taking into account that bilateral trade between the two
countries was mainly balanced. Given the inflows of precious metals into Spain
during those years, a quantitative-theory-based explanation of the exchange rates
was certainly in effect at the beginning of the century, and no major shocks
seemed to take the real exchange rate out of equilibrium –relative prices were mostly
constant throughout the century. Once the inflows of money became more stable,
inflation rates equalized in both countries and the exchange rate stabilized.
However, when trade balance disequilibria became the rule, the exchange rate
started behaving in unison with those balances, depreciating in the face of deficits
and appreciating in the context of surpluses. This is good news for a fundamen-
tal-based explanation of exchange rate behavior. Demand and supply of the
TABLE 3
UNRESTRICTED CO-INTEGRATION
FOR MODIFIED MONETARY MODEL, 1752-1797*
Unrestricted Co-integrating Coefficients:
Exchange Rate Money Diff (TB) Output Diff
3.58 17.18 15.99 16.72
1 Co-integrating Equation (Normalized co-integrating coefficients):  **
Exchange Rate Money Diff (TB) Output Diff
1 4.79 4.46 4.89
(1.31) (1.25) (1.11)
Notes:
* For detailed results on the trace and Max-Eigen tests see Torres et al. (2004).
* * t-stats in parentheses.
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different national currencies –or of bills of exchange– generated by trade flows
seemed to be a key determinant of the evolution of exchange rates. Given that
inflation rates did not differ significantly, the fluctuations of the nominal exchange
rate would imply similar fluctuations of the real exchange rate, and thus significant
real effects should be expected. This was not the case in the first half of the century,
where the behavior of the exchange rate was in perfect consonance with the value
implied by PPP and, therefore, by a constant real exchange rate. We know, however,
that the end of the 18th century corresponds to years of intense and profound
changes in the productive structure of Great Britain, which may have led to
significant changes in the real exchange rate. The discontinuities in the exchange
rate data prevent us from a formal statistical testing of this feature, but the
examination of the exchange rate and trade data seems to point in that direction
and thus suggests fruitful avenues for future research.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the behavior of Spanish exchange rates –vis à vis the
sterling pound– during the 18th century. We provided an overview of the monetary
TABLE 4
UNRESTRICTED ESTIMATION OF ECM
FOR THE MONETARY MODEL, 1752-1797*
Co-integrating Equation**







Error Correction: D(Ex. Rate) D(Money Diff) D(TB) D(Output Diff)
Co-intEq1 -0.0086 0.0334 0.3655 -0.3308
(-0.42) (2.72) (1.63) (-3.26)
R-squared 0.67 0.75 0.64 0.73
Adj. R-squared 0.32 0.49 0.26 0.45
Notes:
* For detailed results on the unrestricted estimation of the ECM for the monetary model
see Torres et al. (2004).
** t-stats in parentheses.
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system in 18th century Spain and of how exchange rates were determined in the
London exchange. Our discussion suggests that during that century exchange
rates quoted in the British press were mainly determined by the market of bills of
exchange, and that government interventions were reactive to market forces rather
than proactive. This makes those years an optimal testing ground for the
relationship of exchange rates to economic fundamentals and we carried out an
analysis of these relationships, using two well-known models.
The results of the analysis suggest that the evolution of exchange rates during
the 18th century, even though not homogeneous throughout the century, could be
used as a textbook example. During the first ninety years of the century, the
exchange rate behaved according to PPP-considerations, and it very closely
mimicked the evolution of inflation differentials. These differentials were most likely
a consequence of variations in relative money supplies. We find, therefore, an
economic context where increases in the quantity of money generated domestic
inflation and the exchange rate moved in order to keep relative price levels
constant. The bilateral trade between the two countries was mostly balanced and
this put little pressure on the exchange rate. However, in the last years of the
century, swings in the exchange rate parallel closely the evolution of the bilateral
trade balance, which in fact became much more unstable. These trade-induced
fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate led to changes in the real exchange rate,
which may have compensated –though our data do not allow for a formal testing–
differences in real growth, in productivity or in costs between the two countries.
These findings are quite relevant from the methodological point of view. The last
point mentioned hints at the strongest conclusion from the historical point of view, a
conclusion that opens quite exciting avenues for future research: the changes in the
real exchange rate experienced in the last years of the century may have benefited
Spain more than was previously thought, since they could be compensating for the
productivity and growth differentials with respect to Great Britain.
We believe our paper has given a step ahead in our understanding of the
functioning of exchange rates and of the historical circumstances of exchange rate
fluctuations. Much work remains to be done, though, especially in data collection and
the construction of appropriate measures of 18th century economic variables. The effort
seems to be warranted, though, since the scope for potential findings is enormous.
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